Book Review: Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo by Clark, Charles E.
REVIEWS
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO. Edited by Mar-
garet E. Hall. With a Foreword by Edwin W. Patterson. New York:
Fallon Law Book Company, 1947. Pp. xxiv, 456. $5.00.
HERE under a single cover are the extra-judicial writings of our great
philosopher-judge. For the most part this book is made up of well-known
materials, including the famous lectures on the judicial process and the
witty and gracious talks on law, literature, opinion writing, the new juris-
prudence, the "game of the law and its prizes," and the "comradeship of
the bar." But there are some new materials of interest: lecture notes from
Professor Nicholas Murray Butler's psychology class; a student essay on
The Moral Element "in Matthew Arnold, suggesting one shaping source for
the Justice's beautiful and lucid prose; and a Columbia Commencement
Oration on The Altruist in Politics. The last, delivered in 1889, was a vigor-
ous condemnation "alike of communism and of socialism that they thwart
the instinct of expansion" or of individual energy and human personality
for the "blind, mechanical power of the State" and suggests some intriguing
comparisons between these early views and the Justice's later constitutional
opinions. Chief Judge Lehman, a close personal friend, contributes a warm
and appreciative memorial. And Professor Patterson, fittingly the first Car-
dozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia,* has a foreword which is an
admirable short introduction to Cardozo's juristic philosophy.'
As a collection of selected writings this volume leaves little to be desired.
Set out in clear and attractive type, with a satisfactory index and an ad-
mirable bibliography of writings both by and about the Justice--the latter
in number and caliber strikingly attesting his philosophical and judicial
eminence-this is a book to serve as an evening companion, as well as a
permanent authority of legal reference. I must confess to a slight nostalgia
for the delightful little books containing the original essays. Those seemed
so distinctively in keeping with their gentle and modest author, but, never-
theless, bore testimony to their notable material success in the notations of
a thirteenth printing for The Nature of the Judicial Process and an eighth
for The Growth of the Law. Also-and I realize how purely personal is this
objection-I miss the footnotes at the foot of the page and dislike to have
to flush them from their hiding places in the interstices between chapters.
Of course, I appreciate the shamefaced approach to footnoting shared gen-
erally by nonlegal editors and publishers. But here, as always, Cardozo was
restrained and modest; and; as the original editions show, his concise cita-
tions were not such as to deface the printed page. Yet these are wholly in-
1. More fully developed in his longer monograph, Cardozo's Philosophy of Law, 88
U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 71, 156 (1939).
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significant complaints; the book deserves and will surely have a wide distri-
bution.
In re-reading the essays on the judicial process, I arf impressed with the
freshness and vitality of his approach and how modem it actually is. Not-
withstanding law's stock in trade of hoary antiquities in the shape of both
precedents and texts, much of judicial writing, particularly of judicial philos-
ophy, is quite ephemeral. A judge's philosophy often does not survive the
particular events which gave it birth and shaped its form. We may well
recall the cynic's view that longevity is the one essential attribute for judicial
greatness. But with occasional exceptions the very temporary quality of
judicial thinking has its uses. The dead hand of the law is heavy enough as
it is; our recurring constitutional crises have borne witness to that fact. One
of the surprising facts of contemporary jurisprudence is the amazing recru-
descence of interest in Holmes, not only as hero-where his fame has long
been secure-but as villain, the representative of law as only crude force, the
seducer of the law schools, which, in turn, betrayed the Court.2 How the
old Roman's eyes would have sparkled at that aspect of posthumous fame!
But while Cardozo cannot aspire to quite that kind of lasting regard, his
own claim to permanent recognition is well buttressed.
It is true that Cardozo, in his brief career on the highest court, consciously
followed the Holmes tradition in helping to free welfare legislation from the
shackles of constitutionalism. Here his function was to be a follower. His
own original contributions were elsewhere, first, as a great common-law
judge, and, second, as a unique expositor of the ways of judges. He came to
the work of the Court of Appeals in New York by designation of the Gover-
nor in 1914 after only a month's service in the trial court. This quick rec-
ognition of his outstanding qualities was soon justified through the high
quality of his appellate work. A decision at once scholarly and pathbreaking
in 1917 on pre-existing duty as consideration for a contract won an approv-
ing review from Professor Corbin, who recommended his appointment as
Storrs Lecturer at Yale. As Professor Corbin has written, this invitation he
"hesitatingly accepted," but the lectures as orally delivered in 1921 "were a
triumph," and as subsequently printed "have become a classic." 3 After a
2. See, e.g., Palmer, Hobbes, Holnws and Hitter, 31 A.B.AJ. 5G9 (1945); Gannon,
The Moral Law, 14 FoRD. L. R-v. 1 (1945), 17 N. Y. Sr. B,%u Bul. 49 (1945), 63 PU.
N:Y. ST. BAR Ass'x 383 (1945) ; Kennedy, Portrait of the Nre Supreme Court, 13 Fora.
L. REv. 1 (1944), 14 id. at 8 (1945). Compare my address, Is Law Disappcaring? at
West Virginia University, June, 1946, to be reprinted in 50 IV. VA. L. Q.-(1947).
3. This bit of history appears in Corbin, Mr. Astice Cardoco W:d the Law of Con-
tracts, one of the notable essays in the joint tribute of three universities in January, 1939.
39 CoL L. Rxv. 56, 64, 52 HARv. L. REv. 408, 416, 48 YArx L. J. 426, 434. The case vas
De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 607 (1917), reviewed in Corbin, Does A
Pre-existing Duty Defeat Consideration?-Recent Note'worthy Decisions, 27 YA=E L. J.
362 (1918). For the contemporary reaction to the lectures, see also my Cardozo Lecture,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooditw Omnipresence of Erie v. Tomph.ns, 55
YALE L. J. 267 (1946).
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quarter of a century The Nature of the Judicial Process still remains as the
best analysis we have of the judge at work.
It is hard for us now to realize just how "daring" 4 was the task Cardozo
so successfully undertook, for the custom of confessions by judges had not
then become general. Previously there had been no attempt by an American
judge to develop a detailed and consistent philosophy of the process of
judicial adjudication. Cardozo's statement came before the days of the judi-
cial "hunch," indeed of "gastronomical jurisprudence" or what he himself
has called "the cardiac promptings of the moment, the visceral reactions of
one judge or another." 5 But both in what he says as to the freedom of judi-
cial action and as to the restraints which circumscribe a judge, his views
are an unusual combination of balance and restraint, with originality and
freedom of judicial action. His later lectures, those on The Growth of the
Law, at Yale, and on The Paradoxes of Legal Science, at Columbia, supple-
ment his first development of the subject, but hardly match the simple but
frank exposition of the judicial way of life to be found in the earlier lectures.
This is not the place for, nor, in view of what has already been written, is
there need of, another revaluation of the lectures. But I desire to refer to
one matter Cardozo always emphasized, which has particular pertinence and
interest in the light of contemporary views. What I 'have chosen to stress
are not his contributions to freedom of judicial decision, but the limitations
on that freed6m which he continuously asserted. My choice is itself a tribute
to the rapidity with which the climate of juristic thought changes. When
the original lectures were given, interest centered in the last of his four
methods of judicial decision, that of sociology, or, as he stated it, with the
directive force of the process exerted along "the lines of justice, morals and
social welfare, the mores'of the day." 6 That was the exciting npw develop-
ment of those days. Justice Cardozo himself manfully carried this approach
from the cloisters of the classroom into the sanctuary of judicial decision it-
self. Indeed his third lecture was boldly entitled The Judge As A Legislator,
while his fourth even quoted the profanations of Theodore Roosevelt that
"the chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are, the judges,
because they are the final seat of authority." I But time moves on; and now
I am at pains to point out not the exuberance of, but rather the restraints
incorporated into, his analysis.
It will be recalled that his other methods were those of philosophy, i.e.,
analogy; of evolution, i.e., historical development; and of tradition, i.e., the
customs of the community. These were not sharply delimited. As Professor
Patterson has so well pointed out, their lines tended to blur and intermingle.
Then, too, the descriptive titles are not altogether helpful; thus one might
4. The adjective is Judge Burch's in his review in 31 YALE L. J. 677 (1922).
5. In his address on Jurisprudence before the New York State Bar Association in
1932, p. 15 of this edition.
6. P. 117 herein; pp. 30, 31, of THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.
7. Pp. 179, 180, herein; pp. 170, 171, of THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.
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not immediately recognize the analysis of precedents as the method of "phi-
losophy." Nor were the four methods real co-ordinates, resorted to in equal
parts or in strict alternation by the judge. Moreover, although the purpose
is to describe how the judge himself approaches the task of decision, the
analysis is often that of the philosopher describing what has taken place in
the juristic mind. It is obvious, however, that he intended to keep his analy-
sis fluid and tentative; and his last lecture properly stresses the "subcon-
scious element" in the process. I agree with Professor Patterson that "one
can quarrel with Cardozo's terminology and one can be baffled by his diffuse-
ness in detail but one can see in the large what he was trying to get at." 8
Hence over and over we find Cardozo stressing the recurring and humdrum
nature of much of the judge's activities. Only rarely does a truly great case
come along to justify real exercise of the judicial wings. In a later lecture
he goes so far as to say that "nine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that
come before a court are predetermined . . . their fate preistablished by
inevitable laws that follow them from birth to death." 0 This figure is
deemed too high by Professor Patterson. But I think the fault is in a bit
of hyperbole in statement and that he was still intending to emphasize the
process of judgment, not the potential result to the individual litigant. In
his first lectures he stated his thought more completely. Here he said that
of the cases in his (appellate) court, "a majority, I think, could not, with
semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one. . . . In another and
considerable percentage, the rule of law is certain, and the application
[through a maze of facts] alone doubtful." While these may often "provoke
difference of opinion among judges," "jurisprudence remains untouched,
however, regardless of the outcome." Only in a comparatively small number
of cases does the creative element in the judicial process find its "opportunity
and power," "where a decision one way or the other will count for the future"
or "advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the development
of the law." 10
I am quite sure that this in general is a fair picture of the work of appellate
courts and that, if anything, the Justice understates the number of truly
original cases. Of course, a judge by study and thought and by careful
choice of expression may lift a case out of the merely dull and casual run;
but even if he makes it a thing of professional joy or beauty, it is still a law-
yer's guide, rather than an original expression of community mores. Perhaps
it is better so. Otherwise in some of our courts decision would have to be
long postponed while the judges tried to reconcile their views of public policy!
Itwas a quite special constitutional problem which brought forth the Brandeis
brief; whether or not it may again become necessary, its use is not as a divin-
ing rod for the ordinary case. As for the trial court, the proportion of the
8. Patterson, supra note 1, at 165.
9. Pp. 212, 213, herein; p. 60 of THE GRon w1 OF THE LAW.
10. P. 177 herein; pp. 164, 165, of THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.
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humdrum is substantially greater. There of course the problem of ascertain-
ing the facts and reconciling them with the assumed principles is more im-
mediately pressing-and perhaps often more exciting. But it does not admit
of more, or even of as much, of the creative element to which Cardozo had
reference.
This leads me to the first of Cardozo's methods and what he has to say
about it. He puts first the rule of analogy, but says that in doing so he does
not rate it as the most important, that, on the contrary, it is often sacrificed
to others, but comes first because it has a certain presumption in its favor.
"Given a mass of particulars, a congeries of judgments on related topics, the
principle that unifies and .rationalizes them has a tendency, and a legitimate
one, to project and extend itself to new cases within the limits of its capacity
to unify and rationalize." " This puts it exactly. True, the revulsion from
the undue worship of precedents in the past was quite sound and desirable.
Indeed even now a judge too often tends to conceal his real decision by mak-
ing an abstraction of a mere rule of procedure or otherwise assuming the
existence of some completely binding authority. Such evasions of individual
judicial responsibility in adjudication may well be condemned and criticized
whenever they appear.' 2 But as a method of adjudication, we still start off, if
indeed we do not end, with a lawyerlike analysis and reconciliation of the
authorities.
Now, after all these years, this may seem like quite an anticlimax. Perhaps
it is; but to avoid being misunderstood, I shall restate just what I have in
mind. I definitely am not saying that these precedents must be examined
because they will lead mechanically or even "inevitakly" to a decision for
one party or another. As we have seen, Cardozo did not mean that; in his
survey there was a considerable group of cases where the judges might dis-
pute as to the actual result. I say only that these other precedents give us
in the main the stuff from which our decisions are wrought. True, there are
a considerable number of cases where analysis-if not manipulation-of the
facts takes the leading role in the process; while in others statutory interpre-
tation, involving modem techniques of balancing bits of legislative history,
holds sway. But even here the thinking of other judges, stimulated by other
lawyers, or by law professors or other text writers in their critical case re-
views, is likely to have a prominent part.
I hope it is clear that I do not urge that this should be the over-all situa-
tion. As a matter of fact, during many years of teaching, I looked for and
thought I observed signs of a broadening of the stuff of decisions. And I
think a lack of means, time, and even of interest has prevented developments
which might have been, or may still be, of great potential value.' 3 I am
11. Note 6 supra.
12. See the discussion of "procedural particularism" in CLARK, HANDBOOK OF Tn
LAW OF CODE PLEADING 69-71 (2d ed. 1947).
13. Thus note that most promising attempt at cultivation of the area common to juris-
prudence and psychology, ROBINSON, LAW AND TnE LAWYERS (1935) passim, and'par-
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merely trying to describe the process as I find it. In my judicial experience,
two reactions are more vivid than the rest. One is the willingness of so many
counsel to go before the courts, even appellate courts, with so little prepara-
tion and so great trust in the judges to do what we have been led by precept
to regard as the prime task of the lawyers. And the other is how, for all of
us on the bench, whatever our prior background-professorial or professional
alike-a case, however drab, takes on life in the light of what other courts
have thought about the same or similar problems. However it may be in the
juridical millenium, at the present time the study of precedents, far from
making justice mechanical, gives it what breadth, depth, and sophistication
of approach it now has. As proof I suggest a comparison of a case where a
judge talks only in terms of his own more or less vague concepts of justice
in the abstract, and one where the result is reached only after a careful survey
of the prevalent thinking, legal and nonlegal, so far as he can find it, upon
the matters in issue.
All this is hardly new. I stress it only for the purpose of pointing a moral
or two. One might concern the preparation of trials and appeals by counsel;
but perhaps a judge should not venture into fields so much the prerogative
of the bar. Moreover, some experience leads me to doubt the value of judi-
cial admonition in the premises. But I am bold enough to venture some sug-
gestions involving the law schools and legal education in general.
First is the conclusion that the job of the schools, in the climate of actual
professional activity, is being done much better than the present chorus of
criticism would indicate. It remains true that the best work in the trial and
appellate courts comes from the product of the modern law school. Much
is made of the lack of experience of these men, the failure of the schools to
attempt more legal clinics, their neglect to bring their students into the
courts-in short their lack of attention or even due reverence to the journey-
men's tricks of the trade. Such suggestions, urged as practical, seem to me
in the highest degree impractical; as has been well said, we should need to
enter our sons at five years of age in a reorganization course to watch a
complete proceeding! I believe that any judge would say from experience
that a client's fate is safer with a youngster who has successfully surmounted
the severe testing of the good schools than an oldster whose experience has
taught him little beyond the obvious. Naturally better than either is the
lawyer who combines capacity and training with experience. That combina-
ticularly at c. 14, unfortunately cut short by the death of its stimulating author. Among a
wealth of fruitful suggestions compare this, p. 168: "There needs to be added to the play
of ideas the play of personality upon personality, of judge upon judge. The psychological
principles of leadership, of jealousy, of positive and negative suggestibility must ultimately
be taken into account if we are to gain an adequate understanding of the judicial process:'
This statement also carried this interesting footnote: "Even such a liberal as Professor
Felix Frankfurter may-draw back timidly before the thought that tact, good humor, ca-
snaraderie may be a potent force within the celestial chamber of the court. See FnrAm-
FuRaa, Ma. Jus"icE HOL~sE, 1931, at 46."
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tion, however, tends to be found less and less in the courtroom as our econ-
omy has developed. I had the explanation recently when I asked one able
former student why he did not appear more frequently in our court. His
answer was, "To tell the truth, I can't afford it. My time is too valuable in
my office to waste it in going before you fellows." Alas that the richest re-
wards of our profession are not to be achieved in the courtroom; but wher-
ever they are, even occasionally in public life, there will be found, successful
and competent, the man who has gone through this supposedly esoteric
training.
But a succeeding thought is that that very success carries its own responsi-
bilities and incentives for increased effort for the schools. It is obvious that
if judges and lawyers are ever to get out of their respective ruts, it is the law
schools which will provide the inspiration and the motive power. Beyond
the fertilizing force of the views of other courts, which I have referred to
above, is the stimulus of the legal texts and reviews, now increasingly rec-
ognized in the opinions. It is not long before some new view by a law teacher
finds lodgment in an opinion; and not unusually a whole current of legal
authority is reversed upon the persuasion of a single law review article.
Further, the law I am discussing, and which was Cardozo's immediate in-
terest, is judge's law. That in all likelihood will occupy less and less of the
law teacher's field. Other processes, legislative, administrative, those of
world assemblies and courts, are more and more within his province. Let us
have more of soul-searchings by the professors; while their accomplishments
are greater than they now appear to believe, their intellectual qualms and
strivings will sooner or later-enrich the judicial process. So I can do no better
than emulate Cardozo in his plaudits for the schools. For he was among the
first in his decisions to show a complete awareness of the impact of scholarly
thinking upon the problems which came before his court. And his lectures
explicitly and implicitly bear tribute to the persuasive and pervasive force
of the writing emanating from the law schools. It is small wonder that he
became almost at once the darling of the schools, which urged his appoint-
ment to the highest court a full decade before the event actually occurredl
Of course no reference, however fleeting, to Cardozo's writings can prop-
erly be made without mention of the beauty and force of his prose style. Had
he not been able to express himself in "glowing, sententious prose," to use
Professor Patterson's apt expression, much of the force of his message would
have been lost. I need not attempt to gild the lily, but I will refer to one
attribute which I have seen little mentioned, his touches of delicate wit and
humor, so unlike a judge. This often appeared in his many expressions of
modest self-depreciation. Thus at the close of one address he says, "Like
Socrates and other bores, I have earned the draft of hemlock if you choose
to pass the cup." 14 On another occasion, when he had been chosen for the




at that particular stage of his life's journey he should have been selected
and thought of the explanation given by Lord Salisbury, as English premier,
for appointing Mr. Alfred Austin poet laureate in succession to Lord Tenny-
son: "I don't think anybody else applied for the post." Then he went on
to disclaim even that modicum of fitness shown by Mr. Austin.13 At times
this could be coupled with a fine sense of irony. What more complete demo-
lition of a majority outburst likening "with denunciatory fervor" an SEC
investigation to the Star Chamber of the Stuarts could be found than his
classic response, "Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile." ,
One more suggestion and I am done. A standard criticism of modem
realists is their supposed repudiation of all moral values and their refusal
to acknowledge the force of ethical principles and the higher law. We need
not stop here to comment upon the interesting dialectical inversion whereby
a movement most prominently identified with warmhearted support of wel-
fare legislation, i.e., increased aid and sustenance for the poor and the unfor-
tunate, should be found thus wanting in moral qualities. We may note,
however, that at least as to Cardozo, who both "preached" and "practiced"
the same doctrine "in a modest way," 17 this charge cannot be maintained.
For he continuously stressed, in his opinions and in his lectures, the shaping
force of the moral values of life." His addresses contain some of the most
felicitous expression of a lofty morality to be found in any professional writ-
ing. The first address of this book, entitled Values, or The Cioice of Tychio
Brahe, tells poetically of a scholar's choice of service and sacrifice in place
of fame and position.' I need not stress this; all who had the rare privilege
of knowing him attested to his high sense of devotion and dedication. His
sincerity was patent. An impulse to quote is here strong; I shall' limit my-
self to a single one. This was his reaction to the "fitness and beauty and
impressiveness" of the grand jurors' oath going back to the day of the Saxon
kings: "Like the tones of a mighty bell, these echoing notes of adjuration
bring back our straying thoughts to sanctity and service. I cannot listen
to them without a thrill. Here .. . imperishably preserved amid the grime
and dust of centuries, the word has been proclaimed, to steady us when we
15. P. 99.
16. Jones v. Securities Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 33 (1936).
17. Cardozo, op. cit. supra note 5, at 13.
18. Thus see his fourth and fifth lectures--"The Function and the Ends of Law"-
in THE GRonWH OF THE LAW, and several of his lectures in THE PAanoxEs OF LEGAL
SciNcF, viz., "The Meaning of Justice-The Science of Values," "The Individual and
Society," "Liberty and Government," also discussion by Professor Patterson, supra note
1. For his judicial decisions, see the careful analyses by various writers in the memorial
number of the Columbia and Harvard Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal cited note
3 mtpra; and see also SHiENTAG, MouLDERS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 1-93 (1943); L v,
CAIMozo AND FRoNIERs OF LEGAL TH xxG (1938).
19. This, the Commencement Address at the Jewish Institute of Religion (1931), we
are told, was requested by hundreds of men in the Armed Forces during World War II.
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seem to falter, to strengthen us when we seem to weaken, to tell us that
with all the failings and backslidings, with all the fears and all the prejudice,
the spirit is still pure." 20
CiARLEs E. CLARK t
PATTERNS OF UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS. By Frederick H. Harbison
and Robert Dubin. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1947. Pp. 221.
$3.75.
THE recent growth of centers devoted to research in labor relations should
be viewed as a Good Thing: the alluring prospect of an integrated social
science glows, like the Grail, ahead.' Anthropologists, economists, psycholo-
gists and sociologists have gathered together to gain knowledge of the inter-
action of human beings and human institutions within an industrial frame-
work. And their quest is worthy: they examine a segment of society whose
daily decisions affect the whole community; they explore an enduring rela-
tion which exists no matter in whose hands the ownership of tools.
Their program entails an initial act of faith. Like all who seek a science
of society, they must assume that they deal with material composed of a
finite number of variables, that the human mind is capable of manipulating
an enormous, reticulated set of factors, that adequate machinery for un-
earthing knowledge of those factors exists, and that the content of each
factor remains fairly stable during the awesomely lengthy and tedious accre-
tion of knowledge. These are large assumptions and their adoption cows
more than the craven. But refusal to adopt them means giving up the battle
-and, indeed, real proof of their invalidity can come only after the assump-
tions are made and the adventure attempted.
2
The search itself raises the further problem of selectivity: faced with the
close-knit fabric of going institutions one must decide what to study. Here
20. Address to the graduating class of St. John's University Law School in 1928, Our
Lady of the Common Law, 13 ST. Joux's L. REv. 231 (1939) ; p. 95 herein.
' Circuit Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
1. And more than prospective is the immediate practical value derived from forums
in which labor and management leaders can gain understanding of the others' viewpoint.
2. The live practical issue is how verifiable social data is to be gathered with a mini-
mum expenditure of time and personnel. To date we seem to have progressed little fur-
ther than the questionnaire and the interview: the data presented is doubly subjective,
being conditioned by its sources as well as by the investigator. And formation of a theory
correlating subjective reaction with pure phenomena seems futile, for it cannot be validated
until the phenomena can be observed. It is, therefore, in the field of techniques that de-
velopments must come. Until then, the social scientist works with feeble tools which may
perhaps be barely efficient in terms of time expenditure but which raise doubts as to the
assumption of "adequate machinery"; and until then an unverifiable" assumption of objec-
tive-subjective correlation must be made.
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